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How Juries Decide Death:
The Contributions of the Capital Jury Projectt
VALERIE P. HANS*
INTRODUCTION
In 1988 I concluded a review of what was then known about capital jury
decision-making with the following observations:
[T]he penalty phase presents significant incongruities. The jurors are
charged with representing the community's judgment, yet the voir dire and
challenge processes have eliminated significant segments of the public from
the jury. Jurors have been influenced by preceding events during voir dire
questioning and the trial in pivotal ways, yet they are instructed to focus
only on aggravating and mitigating evidence. They are told to ignore their
emotions in perhaps one of the most emotionally charged decisions they
will ever make, when a human life quite literally hangs in the balance. The
court's assistance is limited to technical legal advice, likely to be
mysterious and difficult to follow....
Whether the penalty phase jury is fully equipped to handle its burden
remains an unanswered question .... [T]here are gaps in our knowledge
of how the jury confronts the problem of deciding death.'
Seven years later, some of these gaps are being filled by the groundbreaking
work of the Capital Jury Project.
Not since the Chicago Jury Project of the 1950's has there been a
comparable national study ofjury decision-making. The Chicago Jury Project,
sponsored by the Ford Foundation, was the first systematic empirical
examination of the institution of the jury. The Project undertook a coordinated
set of studies, including courtroom observations of voir dire, interviews with
jurors, mock jury simulations, and a centerpiece project examining judge-jury
disagreement. It resulted in several books and scores of articles that greatly
expanded our knowledge of the jury's decision-making process. Harry Kalven,
Jr., and Hans Zeisel, two central figures of the Chicago Jury Project,
described the results of their landmark study of judge-jury disagreement in the
monograph The American Jury.2 It was a remarkable contribution and
stimulated generations of scholars to undertake empirical work on the jury.3
In my view, the Capital Jury Project has similar potential. Its scope is broad
and its potential for enhancing our theoretical understanding ofjuror decision-
making is considerable. It promises to illuminate the now-mysterious
t © Copyright 1995 by Valerie P. Hans. All rights reserved.
* Department of Criminal Justice and Psychology, University of Delaware. Ph.D., University of
Toronto, 1978; M.A., University of Toronto, 1974; B.A., University of California at San Diego, 1973.
1. Valerie P. Hans, Death by Jury, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE APPROACHES 149, 171 (Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988) (© Copyright 1988
by Sage Publications, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications, Inc.).
2. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
3. See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 323 (1991), for a retrospective account of the Chicago Jury Project, including a description of
some of its methodological strengths and limitations, and a discussion of its impact on the field ofjury
studies.
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processes by which jurors decide on life and death. Even at this relatively
early stage, it is generating data and exciting new hypotheses that other
scholars are discussing and debating. Indeed, the Capital Jury Project is likely
to revolutionize our thinking not only about death penalty juries but also
about our system of administering capital punishment.
The impressive papers presented at the National Conference on Juries and
the Death Penalty (many of which are published in this Symposium) illustrate
the breadth and exciting potential of the Capital Jury Project. In this brief
Commentary, I cannot do justice to them. Rather, my remarks will be limited
to a few issues raised by this extraordinary set of papers that have critically
important implications for our theoretical and practical understanding of the
jury.
I. THE POWER OF THE INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY
To date, much of the research on jury decision-making has relied upon the
technique of jury simulation. Under this research method, subjects are given
cases and asked to play the role of jurors. Typically, some aspect of the case
is held constant for some subjects and varied for others. Comparing the
responses of the experimental and control groups provides information
regarding the impact of the manipulated factor on jury decision processes.
Many psychologists trained in experimental methodology became attracted
to the jury as a vehicle for testing theories about individual and group
decision-making, and they undertook jury simulation studies in substantial
numbers. Based as it is on laboratory research methods, jury simulation has
some clear advantages in terms of its ability to allow researchers to make
causal inferences and to control for extraneous factors. Aware of the potential
biases that inevitably arise in face-to-face interviews, many researchers shied
away from the interview method.
Nevertheless, the interviewing of jurors has become newly popular as a
significant technique in the field ofjury studies. Problems of artificiality have
characterized many jury simulation experiments. In addition, sole reliance on
jury simulation methodology has been criticized by scholars and the courts
alike.' Thus, a number of scholars have turned to other methods, including
juror interviews, to supplement simulation work.
Several years ago I began interviewing civil jurors in a multimethodological
study of how the jury responds to cases involving businesses and corpora-
tions.' My students and I interviewed jurors in various locations, including
4. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (criticizing experimental research on death-
qualified juries); Robert M. Bray & Norbert L. Kerr, Methodological Considerations in the Study of the
Psychology of the Courtroom, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 287 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert
M. Bray eds., 1982) (analyzing criticisms of various methodological approaches to the study of juries);
Wayne Weiten & Shari Seidman Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The
Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71 (1979) (cataloging the methodological
problems with jury simulation studies).
5. See Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability in Tort
Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 85 (1992); Valerie P.
Hans & Krista Sweigart, Jurors' Views of Civil Lawyers: Implications for Courtroom Communication,
68 IND. L.J. 1297 (1993).
1234 [Vol. 70:1233
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE CJP
their homes and places of business. In the interviews, we used a semi-
structured interview schedule similar in format to that used by the researchers
from the Capital Jury Project. Without question it was the most deeply
involving and exciting research I have ever conducted. For me, time stood
still as jurors gave accounts of how they decided whether a corporation was
liable, and reflected on the challenges they faced in determining an appro-
priate damage award.
I experienced a similar reaction to the use of interviews by the Capital Jury
Project. What impresses me in this set of articles by researchers associated
with the Project is how powerful the interview method can be with jurors in
capital cases. The articles make for spellbinding reading as one follows the
jurors through the process that leads them first to grapple with the awesome
responsibility they have been given, and then to choose with other jury
members life or death for a fellow citizen.
Interviews are also valuable in that, by allowing jurors a voice, they can
reveal things for which we did not initially know to look. In my own research,
I was prepared to find that jurors are prejudiced against corporations and
willing to award large amounts to the plaintiffs who sue companies. Instead,
I found a strong tendency among jurors to blame the injured plaintiffs for
their own misfortunes and to express neutral or even positive reactions to the
corporate defendants. Austin Sarat reports another such surprise. He finds a
remarkable divergence in the ways in which capital jurors discuss the trial.6
They report graphic memories of the murder weapons, and are able to recount
the injuries of the murder victims in great detail. In contrast, when asked
about their own responsibility for executing another human being, jurors talk
"about their decision to condemn [the defendant] to death as if that decision
were somehow made elsewhere, as if they were not actually making choices
or authorizing anything."7 The defendant's violence is vividly recalled, yet
the legal rules governing the jury's decision on death are barely comprehend-
ed and poorly remembered.8
The interview method seems particularly well-suited for exploring how
jurors cope with the idea of their own responsibility for an execution. Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine how one might successfully simulate the gravity of
this type of decision in a research laboratory. I have more to say below about
the use of the interview method to study comprehension of jury instructions.
Of course, the interview technique possesses certain limitations. Researchers
have discovered that individuals are not particularly good at assessing the
impact of factors that affect their thinking.9 Jurors' memories will deteriorate
6. See Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The Viewfrom
the Jury, 70 IND. LJ. 1103, 1124-27 (1995).
7. Id. at 1130.
8. See James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing: Guided or Misguided?,
70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1168-69 (1995).
9. See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports
on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REv. 231 (1977) (concluding that verbal reports. of mental events
are often inaccurate and incomplete).
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and change over time.' ° They are likely to be influenced by the hindsight
bias." And they will experience pressures to present themselves in a socially
desirable way to the interviewer. Nevertheless, researchers who are aware of
these limitations still have much to gain from the Capital Jury Project's
interviews with death penalty jurors.
II. THE JUROR'S SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR A
DEATH SENTENCE
Several of the articles describe the process by which jurors are led by the
procedures of guided discretion to abdicate responsibility for their decision on
death. The jurors' accounts are compelling in this regard, and are particularly
striking in the jurisdiction of Indiana, in which the jury's role is advisory. 2
For me, the evidence about jurors' responsibility seems to point in two
directions. Yes, jurors report relief at having others take part of the responsi-
bility for the death decision, as Hoffmann, Sandys, and Sarat describe. 3 But
what is equally clear is that jurors struggle with their own responsibility for
executing another. Jurors report that they are unable to sleep; that they are
driven to reduce stress; and that they remain haunted by the experience for
years.'4 Thus, they experience a good deal of conflict and dismay over their
task. Deciding death is not something that is easily reduced to an algebraic
exercise of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Rather, it is
quite difficult for jurors to re-frame their decision on death. Hoffmann and
Sarat acknowledge this reality, but stress the jurors' abdication of responsi-
bility.'" I would also emphasize the jurors' seriousness of purpose and the
way in which they appear to be deeply troubled by their participation as
indicative of just how difficult the decision to impose the death penalty is.
An important item included in the interview schedules asks jurors to rank
a number of potential actors in terms of their responsibility for the defen-
dant's punishment. 6 Jurors are given the choices of the defendant, the juror,
the jury, the judge, and the law. I suspect that jurors found this question
ambiguous and challenging. At least two distinct elements might be differen-
tiated. First, how responsible is the defendant for the crime, and for the
punishment that follows the crime? The norm of individual responsibility is
10. David M. Sanbonmatsu et al., Remembering Less and Inferring More: Effects of Time of
Judgment on Inferences About Unknown Attributes, 61 J. PERSONAuTY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 546 (1991)
(showing how the passage of time affects memory).
11. Jonathan D. Casper et al., Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1989) (demonstrating a hindsight bias in juror decision-making).
12. See Joseph L. Hoffinann, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility
in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1146-47 (1995).
13. See id. at 1153; Maria Sandys, Cross-Overs-Jurors Who Change Their Minds About the
Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183, 1209 (1995); Sarat, supra note
6, at 1130.
14. See Hoffmann, supra note 12, at 1155.
15. See id. at 1157; Sarat, supra note 6, at 1128.
16. WilliamJ. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings,
70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1094 (1995).
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strongly held and widely shared. It is not surprising that almost six out of
every ten jurors responded to this general question about responsibility by
placing the lion's share on the defendant.' 7 The Capital Jury Project
researchers assert that this suggests that jurors are not taking on the
responsibility for the death sentence themselves. But I believe that the
defendant's perceived responsibility could be considered along an independent
dimension, and that jurors themselves could still experience a sense of
personal responsibility for their own actions.
Second, there is the fascinating allocation of responsibility among the
jurors, the judge, and the law. Although only a minority of jurors focused on
these actors in ranking responsibility, it is interesting to observe that in states
such as Indiana and Florida in which juries provide only advisory opinions,
Bowers finds that jurors assign less responsibility to the jury than do jurors
from states in which the jury's decision is binding on the court.' 8 Here, the
jurors are absolutely correct: They do play only one part in the collective
decision to execute another human being. Their role is a significant and
unique one, but it coexists with the roles of other decision-makers at other
choice points. The troubling and important question raised by the Capital Jury
Project's research is whether the provisions designed to protect against
disparity and error have produced such a diffusion of responsibility that the
sentencing jury no longer feels an appropriate level of personal responsibility
for its actions. The insights about how jurors grapple with this responsibility,
and how their sense of responsibility is affected by law, are sure to be some
of the lasting contributions of the Capital Jury Project.
III. PROBLEMS WITH GUIDED DISCRETION
The Capital Jury Project presents us with the opportunity to assess the
nation's twenty-year experiment in guiding the discretion of the sentencing
jury during a separate penalty phase. The findings are disquieting. Many
jurors have reached their decisions regarding whether the defendant deserves
capital punishment before the penalty phase.' 9 In fact, three-fourths of the
jurors interviewed in the first seven states by Capital Jury Project researchers
reported that the judicial instructions "simply provided a framework for the
decision most jurors had already made."2 At one level, these findings
suggest the stunning irrelevance of guided discretion statutes and instructions.
Most jurors have formed strong impressions about the defendant's candidacy
for death before they have even begun the penalty phase. Considering the
research on the cognitive processes underlying juror decision-making,2 it
17.Id.
18. Id. at 1095 n.233.
19. See id. at 1090; Sandys, supra note 13, at 1191-95.
20. Bowers, supra note 16, at 1093.
21. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE
THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) (arguing that
jurors construct plausible and coherent stories from trial evidence).
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will be an uphill battle to attempt to guide and instruct the jury in the
sentencing phase. Judicial instructions are unlikely to guide the jury in any
meaningful way.
Yet, the interviews also provide strong evidence that the efforts to guide the
discretion of jurors are not irrelevant at all. All the same, these findings are
disquieting too. The instructions appear to lessen the responsibility that jurors
feel for the death sentence. And, importantly, as has been shown in other jury
research, the judicial instructions are frequently employed as persuasive
arguments in group decision-making, especially to convince the minority to
go along with the rest of the jury.22 The instructions are perhaps ideal face-
saving devices for a minority juror who is looking for a way to exit
gracefully. Even if judicial instructions are misused or misrepresented within
the deliberation, few other jurors will be able to correct legal errors.
The instructions also badly confuse jurors. The paper by James Luginbuhl
and Julie Howe shows significant misunderstanding of jury instructions in the
penalty phase.23 Particularly troubling, of course, is the misunderstanding of
the concept of mitigating evidence and how it is to .be used in decision-
making. Luginbuhl and Howe convincingly demonstrate how these misunder-
standings systematically predispose jurors to favor death.24
While interviews are an excellent technique for learning about how jurors
understand their own responsibilities, the use of interviews to study miscom-
prehension of judicial instructions is more problematic. We cannot rely
exclusively on jurors' reports about whether they understood the instructions.
Past research indicates that even when jurors demonstrably misconstrue
important instructions, they are likely to report that they had no problems with
the judge's instructions about the law.25 In addition, juror recall of judicial
instructions is likely to be quite susceptible to decay over time. Jurors who
actually understood and correctly applied a judicial instruction at the trial may
be unable to report it during an interview some time later.
More convincing proof that jurors misunderstand death penalty instructions
may be found in the jury simulations conducted by Luginbuh 26 and the
research done in connection with the case of James Free.27 Mr. Free, who
22. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
205, 222-23 (1989).
23. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 8, at 1165-75.
24. Id. at 1177.
25. See Anthony N. Doob, Canadian Juror's View of the Criminal Jury Trial, in LAW REFORM
COMM'N OF CANADA, STUDIES ON THE JURY 29, 60-64 (1979) (Criminal Law Series Study Paper)
(finding that 97% of jurors surveyed reported that judicial instructions were easy to understand, yet one-
fourth could not define the burden of proof, and at least one-half of the jurors in cases in which the
defendant had a criminal record could not recall the limiting instructions that judges had given
pertaining to the defendant's criminal record).
26. James Luginbuhl, Comprehension of Judges' Instructions in the Penalty Phase of a Capital
Trial: Focus on Mitigating Circumstances, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 203 (1992) (showing problems in
the understanding of jury instructions about mitigating evidence).
27. For excellent discussions of the empirical research and its use in the Free case, see Shari
Seidman Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists, Juries, and Judges, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 423
(1993), and Judith N. Levi, Evaluating Jury Comprehension of Illinois Capital-Sentencing Instructions,
68 AM. SPEECH 20 (1993).
1238 [Vol. 70:1233
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE CJP
has since been executed, challenged his death sentence in part on the ground
that the judicial instructions in the sentencing phase confused the jury.28
Zeisel developed a simulation study using the facts of the Free case and
penalty phase instructions that were similar to those given to Illinois juries in
capital cases. Zeisel demonstrated empirically that members of the Illinois
jury pool showed very high levels of misunderstanding of the meaning of
these instructions immediately after hearing them.29
Even though the simulation research constitutes more convincing evidence
that juries significantly misunderstand sentencing phase instructions, the work
that Luginbuhl and Howe have undertaken remains highly significant. Their
research based on juror interviews provides converging proof that the same
kinds of misunderstandings occur in both experimental and real capital jury
decision-making. Whether they are given these instructions in the quiet of the
laboratory or the intense experience of the capital trial, whether they hear
them from a researcher or a judge, and whether they report their under-
standings immediately or much later, people show serious comprehension
problems. The interview study approach is also important because it shows
how these misunderstood instructions come to play a pivotal role in jury
deliberations-when jurors employ them repeatedly as persuasive devices.3"
Thus, the findings of the Capital Jury Project point to a significant, and
potentially correctable, problem with the judicial guidance given the capital
jury. Research indicates that lay comprehension can be dramatically improved
when judicial instructions. are rewritten following psycholinguistic principles
of clear speech.' Comprehension is most enhanced when instructions take
into account jurors' prior assumptions about law.32 By uncovering jurors'
difficulties with sentencing phase instructions, and by informing us about
other preexisting views held by jurors that could interfere with understanding
and applying the law, the Capital Jury Project has made a vital two-fold
contribution.
28. See Free v. Peters, 806 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. II1. 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 12 F.3d
700 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 433 (1994).
29. Although the judge accepted the evidence and overturned Free's death sentence, the Seventh
Circuit reversed and reinstated the death penalty. Free, 12 F.3d 700.
30. See Hoffmann, supra note 12, at 1152-53.
31. See AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982)
(describing comprehension problems with judicial instructions and methods of rewriting instructions that
will improve understanding); see also Levi, supra note 27.
32. Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857 (1991); Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide:
Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507 (1993) (showing how mock jurors' prior
knowledge affects their understanding of judicial .instructions).
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CONCLUSION
As my remarks indicate, the Capital Jury Project has begun to elucidate the
once-hidden processes by which jurors decide whether a fellow citizen
deserves to live or die. The articles published in this Symposium-even at this
early stage-already raise significant questions about the way in which jurors
cope with their awesome responsibility, and point to some very specific
failures of our nation's experiment with guided discretion in capital trials.
Future work promises to shed even more light on these matters. The Capital
Jury Project is sure to fundamentally enrich our knowledge and understanding
of jury. decisions in capital trials.
Its findings also speak to broader issues in other domains. For example, in
the civil justice system, there is a vigorous and highly contentious debate over
the desirability of providing more judicial guidance to the jury in determining
damage awards.33 Jurors themselves report a desire for more direction from
the court as they undertake this complex task. In addition, repeat litigants
such as businesses have pressured state legislatures and Congress to institute
greater control and limits on jury discretion in compensatory and punitive
damages.34
Yet, the data now being generated by the Capital Jury Project sound a
warning about traveling the road of greater guidance. The articles show some
of the pitfalls of attempting to instruct jurors about how they should go about
representing the voice of the community. Indeed, the Capital Jury Project's
findings suggest that the community's voice may be transformed, muffled, or
even silenced by the court's guidance.
33. See Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CML
JURY SYSTEM 306, 322-27 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
34. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the. Races": The 1980's Tort Crisis and the
Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207 (1990); see also H.R. 1075, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201
(1995).
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